1. Introduction. 1. Introduction. Philosophers have long speculated about the strong constraints that brain science will or should provide for any future possible psychological theories. Hempel (1949) advocated replacing psychological language with physical language, which would be used to describe both behavior and brain states. Quine (1974) maintained that mentalistic talk could be tolerated in psychology only provisionally, as a means toward a full physiological or physical explanation of behavior. P. S. Churchland (1986) foresaw the replacement of "folk psychology" with neuroscientific descriptions. On the other side, Fodor (1974) has long plumped for the autonomy of psychology from neuroscience, by analogy with the (alleged) hardware-independence of computer programs.
any event he dismissed (1975, 17 ) the importance of physiology for psychology without engaging the living body of work in physiological psychology.
Contemporary philosophy of science seeks to understand the cognitive features of living science. Without aiming to be merely descriptive, it seeks to capture conceptual relations and explanatory structures that have a basis in actual scientific practice. In this article I appeal to real cases in support of the argument that, typically, psychological theory has led the way toward neuroscientific understanding. Section 2 surveys some major results in sensory psychology. Section 3 examines the strongest alleged case for the neuroscientific revision of fundamental psychological theory, the neurological finding of selectively preserved memory in amnesiacs. In section 4, I offer a simple and straightforward conceptual argument that psychology must lead the way toward a neuroscientific understanding of mental function and the brain's role therein. These reflections and arguments raise the question of how it could have seemed so obvious to some philosophers that neuroscience must strongly condition or even replace psychology. Section 5 examines this question and asks what it means to say instead that psychology conditions neuroscience.
2. Sensory Physiology: Psychology Leads and Constrains Neurophysiology. 2. Sensory Physiology: Psychology Leads and Constrains Neurophysiology.
Sensory physiology is an area of rich interaction between neuroscience and psychology, and one in which knowledge is well advanced in both domains. I consider the relation between psychology and neurophysiology in three historical cases that span the modern period. The earliest case serves as a reminder that a basic functional parsing of the body and nervous system is itself a fundamental achievement, and is by no means obvious. The three cases are binocular single vision, stereopsis, and opponent processes in color vision. _ 2._ 1. _ N_ e_ w_ t_ o_ n _ a_ n_ d _ B_ i_ n_ o_ c_ u_ l_ a_ r _ S_ i_ n_ g_ l_ e _ V_ i_ s_ i_ o_ n. We have two eyes with overlapping fields of vision, which receive separate impressions from objects in the area of overlap, and yet we usually see such objects singly. Since antiquity, these facts have led visual theorists to speculate about how single vision is achieved (Wade 1987) . Early theorists, including Galen (discussed in Siegel 1970, 59-62) , Alhazen (Ibn al-Haytham) , and Witelo (discussed in Hatfield and Epstein 1979) , proposed a physiological unification of binocular stimulation in the optic chiasma (where the two optic nerves meet). But since the optic nerves separate at the chiasma and continue on [S390] to separate sides of the brain, a question remained about how the post-chiasmally separate optic nerves mediate single vision (see, e.g., the figure in Discourse 5 of Descartes' _ D_ i_ o_ p_ t_ r_ i_ c, [1637] 1958, 149) .
Various early modern solutions were proposed, including Descartes' unification of binocular stimulation at the pineal gland (Descartes [1664] 1985, 105). In the Queries to his _ O_ p_ t_ i_ c_ s, Newton (1704) speculatively advanced the anatomical scheme that in fact underlies single vision. He proposed that nerve fibers from the two eyes "partially decussate"--that is, partially cross--in the optic chiasma, so that fibers from each hemifield of the retina join in the chiasma and proceed to their respective side of the brain in a manner that preserves retinotopic order. His reasoning was based on some erroneous comparative anatomy (he mistakenly believed that fish and chamelia lack a chiasma), but his functional conjecture was sound and was confirmed by observations on brain damaged patients during the eighteenth century (Finger 1994, 83) . One of the foremost findings in sensory physiology in the mid twentieth century was the discovery, using single cell recording techniques in cats and primates, of neurons in the visual cortex that are activated only by input from both eyes (Barlow, Blakemore, and Pettigrew 1967, Poggio and Fischer 1977) . Further, neurons receiving stimulation from one or both eyes are laid out retinotopically across the back of the brain (Barlow 1990 When binocularly driven neurons were discovered in the 1960s, some of them showed sensitivity to varying degrees of disparity. Investigators immediately conjectured that these "disparity detectors" serve the binocular depth response (Barlow et al. 1967) . In this case, a newly discovered anatomical structure and its physiological activity were interpreted in relation to a visual capacity whose properties had been discovered through psychophysical and psychological investigation alone. The precise psychological mechanism by which the detection of local retinal disparities produces a depth response remains unknown. Turner 1994, 130-4) . Neither of these arguments was based on knowledge of retinal anatomy and microphysiology. Indeed, the photic properties of the cones, which are the retinal element subserving daytime color vision, were directly measured only in the latter twentieth century (Kaiser and Boynton 1996, chap. 5). Helmholtz's arguments were based on color matching experiments (on both normal and color deficient observers), in which lights of known spectral composition are adjusted until they look the same. Hering's arguments were based on similar types of measurements, and on phenomenological observations. On phenomenal grounds, Hering contended that there are four color primaries: red, yellow, blue, and green. He argued that afterimages reveal adaptation effects among the four primaries, thereby revealing linkage in the underlying physiology: yellow produces a blue afterimage, red a green one, and so on. He also observed that color deficient individuals are always "red and green blind" (or "blue and yellow blind"), but are never simply "red blind" or "green blind." On these grounds he speculatively postulated yoked physiological process underlying red-green and blue-yellow perception, which operate in opponent fashion, so that a red sensation arises when the red-green channel is driven one direction, and a green sensation when it is driven in the opposite, or opponent, direction. In the 1950s Leo Hurvich and Dorothea
Jameson revived the opponent process theory, arguing from psychophysical data obtained in certain kinds of color mixture experiments (cancellation experiments, reviewed in Hurvich 1981, chaps. 5-6). Subsequently, opponent neural mechanisms were discovered in the retina, lateral geniculate nucleus, and other brain loci. The theory that the three types of cone in normal human eyes are linked neurophysiologically into opponent processes is now widely accepted (Kaiser and Boynton 1996, chap. 7).
In the three cases reviewed, psychophysics and phenomenology led the way to the postulation and subsequent confirmation of neural mechanisms. Which is not to say that researchers do not work the other way around, using specific neurophysiological findings to generate new research questions. Ken Nakamura (1990) contended that findings about brain anatomy called for some new psychological theorizing. Neurophysiologists had found that a larger portion of cerebral cortex is devoted to vision than had been thought, and that the areas are highly subdivided. He described this as a case in which, for once, "it is the physiologists who seem to be leading the way, at least as far as higher visual functions are [S393] concerned." In order to redress "this imbalance between psychology and neurophysiology," he offered a "speculative theory as to the overall functional organization of the visual system" (Nakamura 1990, 411) . Physiology had shown the existence of apparently specialized areas, and psychology would now propose a functional organization for them, drawing on work from cognitive psychology, psychophysics, physiology, and artificial intelligence. Peter Kaiser and Robert Boynton, co-authors of the standard handbook on human color vision, allow that in work on color vision findings from anatomy, neurophysiology, and photochemistry have sometimes inspired new psychophysical experiments, but they maintain that "the data of the psychophysicist, together with theories developed from such data, provide a framework within which the electrophysiologist conducts his research" (Kaiser and Boynton 1996, 26-27) . Which suggests that while physiological facts and theories may inspire or confirm research and theory cast in psychological language, psychological language remains the primary vocabulary for describing the functions being investigated, including those investigated in neurophysiological research. Patricia Churchland (1986 , 1996 has claimed that in some areas of work neurological results have led the way to a radical rethinking of basic theoretical categories in psychology. She makes the boldest claim for work in memory, declaring that "some data discovered by neuropsychologists are so remarkable, and so contrary to common assumptions, that they suggest that some basic assumptions about memory may be in need of radical revision" (Churchland 1986, 150) . What are these basic assumptions?
Are they merely the assumptions of "folk psychology," or does she mean the assumptions of scientific (experimental) psychology? Although "folk psychology" is her usual target, Churchland here addresses experimental psychology directly. She asserts that psychological theory on topics such as memory is in a "_ s_ t_ a_ t_ u _ n_ a_ s_ c_ e_ n_ d_ i," its current level of development being "pretheoretical" (1986, 149, 153 1980 , Squire and Cohen 1984 , Cohen 1984 ) the theoretical framework they adopted was drawn from previous work
[S395] in experimental psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy, as were the motivation for the empirical questions they asked and the experimental procedures they adopted.
The relevant part of Squire and Cohen's work concerned preserved learning and memory capacities in amnesiacs. The "preserved" capacities are those unaffected or only partially affected by the cause of the amnesia. It was well-known that amnesiacs who suffer severe memory deficits may suffer no effects on perceptual-motor learning and memory (Milner, Corkin and Teubner 1968) . Squire and Cohen asked whether other sorts of skills are preserved.
In Cohen and Squire 1980 they showed that amnesiac patients could perform well on a pattern-analyzing skill, which involved reading mirror-reversed words.
Although the patients could not remember previous trials, even from day to day, their performance showed dramatic improvement over three consecutive days of testing and in a retest three months later. Cohen and Squire (1980) interpreted their results in relation to proposals made by Kolers (1975) and by Winograd (1972) . Kolers (1975) (for haptic form, pressure, temperature, and more), thereby overturning the tradition of the "five senses" (Scheerer 1995, 825, 851-856) . In this case, a traditional classification was overturned as psychology advanced. Still, as sensory psychology has developed into a mature science its language has remained mentalistic, including talk of information, representation, experienced qualities, perceived intensities, and so forth. Similarly, the language of attention research, while it has grown more precise, shows continuity with centuries of reflection on the phenomena of attention, mentalistically described (Hatfield 1998) . The mentalistic language of psychology should not be equated with outdated tradition. It is a living vocabulary. And it is the vocabulary for describing global brain function.
The brain is a mental organ.
These considerations provide the basis for a relatively straightforward argument to the effect that psychology must provide the primary theoretical vocabulary for describing many brain functions. The argument goes as follows:
(1) The operations of the brain can be partitioned into various subsystems, study of which constitutes study of brain function.
(2) Some of the functions realized by the brain are mental functions (e.g., perception, attention, memory, emotions).
(3) Psychology is the experimental science that directly studies mental functions.
(4) Hence psychology is the primary discipline covering a major subset of brain functions.
(5) Although it may be possible on occasion to reason from structure to function, in general knowledge or conjecture about function guides investigation of structure.
(6) And so psychology leads the way in brain science.
The premises have various bases, some tending toward the conceptual, some (6) follows from (4) and (5).
5. Constraint. 5. Constraint. Suppose for the moment that this argument is correct.
What implications does it have for the deeply held intuition that neuroscience is more basic than, and strongly conditions, psychology?
One could argue that psychology leads neuroscience only because of the epistemic limitations of the investigators. Because we start from a position of ignorance, we need to move from function to structure. But once we come to understand brain structure, we will see how it limits brain function. This position is in fact intuitively plausible. But to understand its import we should consider further the notion of constraint.
How does knowledge of one science constrain another? Once one understands chemistry, it becomes apparent that you cannot make water from carbon and nitrogen. The constituents constrain what can be done, or made, with them. Perhaps adequate knowledge of the brain would constrain psychology in the same way.
This I think is the model of constraint implicit in the intuition that neuroscience must constrain psychology. At a very general level, we can suppose that some constraint of this sort is known to us. We perhaps can be said to know that the nervous system of an earthworm is incapable of supporting philosophical reflection. Given the worm's ganglia, we see that it is unable to do philosophy; there are not enough circuits to permit deep reflection. (In fact our belief here is largely guided by knowledge of earthworm behavior in relation to its ganglia, but let us ignore this for the sake of argument.) Beyond extreme and very general instances such as this, so little is known about how brains realize psychological states and processes that this sort of constraint from constituent structure has no consequences for practice, now or in the foreseeable future.
A related intuition behind the idea that neuroscience constrains psychology is that physics is the basic science of what there is, and neuroscience is closer to physics than is psychology. Because physics is The second intuition concerns an alleged contrast in empirical rigor between physics and psychology. Allegedly, physics is hard and objective, psychology is soft and subjective. According to Quine (1974, 36) , psychological notions thrive in darkness, and they will dissipate when physics, or neuroscience, turns on the light. This argument relies on an inaccurate portrayal of the achievements of psychology. Typically, it relies on the construal of psychology as "folk psychology," that is, as a codification of (allegedly) ordinary ascriptions of beliefs and desires to explain behavior. But, as suggested above, the mentalistic vocabulary of psychology is a living body of scientific description. If it is to be challenged, it must be challenged on its own terms, and not, as often happens, by surreptitiously changing the subject so as to substitute so-called "folk The idea that neuroscience can or should deeply constrain psychology is based on two sorts of arguments. First, there are abstract arguments concerning publicity, mushiness, nomic asymmetry, and ontological asymmetry.
The first three sorts of argument are unconvincing. Ontological asymmetry provides a general constraint on solutions to the mind-body problem. But it does not offer real guidance for contemporary psychology.
The second sort of argument, from constituent structure, is based on the hope that future understanding of the brain will permit strong constraints to be "read off" descriptions of neural structure and activity. At present, constraints of this sort are at best very general, such as that earthworms cannot do philosophy. We can hope that knowledge of the brain's properties will progress to the point where this sort of constraint from constituent elements becomes available. One thing is for sure. If brain science does develop to that extent, psychology will lead the way. Fodor, Jerry A. (1975) , _ L_ a_ n_ g_ u_ a_ g_ e _ o_ f _ T_ h_ o_ u_ g_ h_ t. New York: Crowell.
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